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In recent years, scholars from different disciplinary backgrounds such as 
anthropology, sociology, psychology and history have paid increasing attention to 
collective memory in the underwriting and construction of group identity1. Within the 
discipline of sociology, most studies of memory work have focused on various sites of 
inscribed, written-down memory such as museums, memorials, films, websites, song, 
books, magazines and so forth. Less attention has been given to non-inscribed ways of 
bringing the past into the present such as marches, processions and parades. Of those 
studies that do examine embodied forms of remembrance and the mnemonic capacities of 
the body, Paul Connerton’s text How Societies Remember has been particularly 
influential as a theoretical point of departure2. This article employs, and extends, 
Connerton’s framework to help make sense of the annual re-enactment of the Bloody 
Sunday3 march, a movement through space that also entails a movement through time.  
After providing a brief theoretical reference point for the paper, through the work 
of Connerton, I then go on to delineate a three-stage periodization of the march focusing 
on important shifts and changes between each stage as well as accumulations across 
them. In the section that follows this I return to the theoretical claims introduced earlier 
and seek to call attention to underanalyzed aspects of Connerton’s theorization of bodily 
memory pointed to by the empirical data, specifically the extent to which embodied 
remembrance undergoes change and modification over time and how performative ritual 
in the context of an unsettled society4 such as Northern Ireland is politically charged and 
responsive to wider socio-historical shifts and currents.  
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As the title of Connerton’s authoritative work suggests, he is concerned with how 
societies represent the past but particularly through performing history in the form of 
commemorative ritual. He begins his work by drawing attention to and criticizing the 
strong textual tilt that seems to dominate social science scholarship and the consequent 
lack of attention to non-textual means, or what he calls embodied means, of remembering 
the past. This foregrounding of texts, as the expense of bodies, can be mapped on to a 
wider shift from oral to print culture. He writes that “although bodily practices are in 
principle included as possible objects of hermeneutic inquiry, in practice hermeneutics 
has taken inscription as its privileged object”5. By seeking, then, to offer “an account of 
how practices of a non-inscribed kind are transmitted, in and as a tradition”6, he attempts 
to problematize the privileging of inscription in existing analyses of collective memory7. 
For Connerton, bodily social memory is carried through two kinds of social practices: 
formal, scripted commemorative ceremonies and more informal bodily practices such as 
postures, gestures and bodily etiquette with respect to food and eating, that evoke the 
past, often in unthinking and taken-for-granted ways, but “without explicitly representing 
it in words or images”8.  
Commemorative ceremonies include parades, marches, wreath-laying ceremonies 
and the like and it is this aspect of his work that I seek to draw on and contribute to in this 
paper. Central to these commemorative ceremonies is the notion of performative re-
enactment, of repeating history as it really was. When Christians re-enact Christ’s death 
at Easter, for example, they make an explicit link with an actual past event. We are doing 
this now as it was done thousands of years ago. These ritual performances are centrally 
implicated in the construction and underwriting of communal memory and consist, 
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according to Connertion, of “more or less invariant sequences of formal acts and 
utterances”9, suggesting that ritual re-enactments of the past, and especially those of a 
religious kind, are capable of resisting change or what he terms variance. But, as I hope 
to show, bodily memory, or at least that of a vernacular, non-official kind, may well be 
much more indeterminate, especially ritual re-enactments organized against a shifting 
political landscape and in the context of a deeply divided and conflictual society like 
Northern Ireland.   
While Connerton has made an important intervention in building the conceptual 
scaffolding of collective memory scholarship, I try to make the case that Connerton’s 
central claim about the “more or less invariant sequences of formal acts”10 that make up 
symbolic rituals may be less applicable to acts of bodily memory organized at grassroots 
civil society level and in resistance to official forms of memory. Most of Connerton’s 
empirical examples of rituals are either of religious rituals or of state-sponsored rituals 
such as commemorations of Bastille Day in France and one wonders about whether his 
theoretical claims can be extended to bodily rituals that explicitly contest official 
collective memory, as in the case of Bloody Sunday.  
To make this argument, then, I draw on the case of Bloody Sunday, focusing in 
particular on the way this event has been remembered through an annual march re-
enacting the original 1972 march, when thirteen civilians were shot dead by British 
soldiers while peacefully marching against internment11.  Although Bloody Sunday is 
now commemorated through a series of events over a week, an annual commemorative 
march has always been the central event of the commemorative calendar drawing the 
biggest crowds and attracting, at least in more recent times, significant media attention. I 
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show, following Maurice Halbwachs12, how and why this ritual re-enactment of the past 
reflected and responded to changing socio-political circumstances, interests and needs. 
Thus, I pay attention to the wider political context in which the march took place and 
explain its evolving structure with respect to shifts in relations of power between the two 
divided communities that make up Northern Irish society.  
My sociological-historical analysis of this march is based upon a number of 
archival sources, including newspaper accounts and film footage, interview data, and a 
participant observation study of the 33rd and 34th anniversary commemoration march and 
rally. I argue that three stages define the march: (1) Stage 1: Pre-Hegemonic: Sinn Féin13 
(SF) versus Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association14 (NICRA), 1973-1975; (2) Stage 
2: Hegemonic: SF’s appropriation of the march, 1975-1990; and, (3) Stage 3: The Quest 
for Power to Define the Truth, 1990-present. This periodization of the march is based on 
changes in memory entrepreneurship and changes in the historical symbols and images 
carried on the march. 
Stage 1 looks at the contest between SF and NICRA over control of the 
memory of Bloody Sunday and the minor role of other social movement 
organizations. In the early to mid 1970s, SF and NICRA both organized marches 
on the same weekend but, to avoid confrontation, on different days. The NICRA 
commemorations were small in scale in comparison to the SF commemorations 
and they were more private events for the victims’ families than they were public. 
NICRA speakers spoke about the importance of remembering and made 
statements about its hopes that the values of democracy and non-violence that the 
Bloody Sunday dead stood for would not be forgotten.  
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At the SF commemorations, the political claim-making was very different. 
SF commemorations were used as an opportunity to rally support for physical 
force republicanism, to express anti-British hostility and to amplify a 
victimization narrative while emphasizing that the Bloody Sunday victims should 
never be forgotten. In these speeches the suffering of victims of “the other” (and 
most often at the hands of republicans), that is, the Unionist/Protestant community 
were omitted, representing a kind of selective forgetting of victimhood. 
Republicans exhorted their followers to continue the armed struggle as a homage 
to the victims of Bloody Sunday. For them, Bloody Sunday represented all that 
was unjust about the British state and so it became an important symbol around 
which to mobilize support for its goals.  
This early pre-hegemonic phase of contestation between different voices 
(including Derry Women’s Action Committee, People’s Democracy and the Irish Front 
who organized marches in the 1972-77 period) was followed by Stage 2 in which SF 
settled down into its role as the dominant memory choreographer of Bloody Sunday. Put 
another way, from 1978, SF had the march to itself. Although NICRA’s commemorative 
role had been reduced to organizing a wreath-laying ceremony at the Rossville Street 
memorial to Bloody Sunday, SF nonetheless faced strong and frequent criticism from the 
SDLP. SF, in turn, tended to use the Bloody Sunday commemoration as an opportunity to 
criticize constitutional nationalism both north and south of the border as well as the Irish 
Catholic hierarchy, a favourite target of republican critique. This is followed by Stage 3 
where I look at the march as a cultural tool for mobilizing support for the quest for a new 
inquiry. This stage was marked by more intense memory work and entrepreneurship than 
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the two earlier stages. During this phase, Irish nationalists began to gain more cultural 
and political power in Northern Ireland and this was expressed in very high levels of 
attendance at the commemoration marches towards the end of this period. A rhetorical 
emphasis on critiquing other nationalists was diminished in this phase as republican and 
nationalist interests in challenging the official memory met and a new rapprochement 
between Northern Ireland’s two divided communities began to take shape. But before 
examining each stage in deeper detail it is useful to begin by briefly looking at the origins 
of parading in the Northern Ireland context and the general properties of the Bloody 
Sunday march.  
 
Origins and Meaning of Marches in the Northern Irish Context. The tradition of 
parading can be traced to the guild processions of Middle Ages Europe. Parades are 
defined by Warner as a “recognized and socially defined public use of symbols in a set of 
formal and informal social relations. An activity is recognized as such by those who 
participate in it and by those who study it at the explicit and open level of social behavior 
it is not something they do unconsciously”15. This form of social walking, and others 
such as processions, pilgrimages, promenades and pageants, have long been used both to 
legitimize and to contest state power16
 Northern Ireland has a rich history of parades and marches17. Once the preserve 
of the unionist tradition, this cultural form has also been recently taken up by nationalists 
as a means of remembering significant past events. Marches are one powerful way in 
which social groups in Northern Ireland create and sustain difference and symbolically 
express the power dynamics that shape their everyday lives18. While loyalist parades pay 
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homage to memories of victory and triumph, nationalist marches are victim parades 
honoring memories of loss, tragedy and defeat19.  
 
 
General Properties of the Bloody Sunday March. On the 30th of January every year, 
republicans and nationalists have marked out this day to reflect on and remember what 
happened on this day in 1972. By ritually reenacting the original march over the same 
route at the same time, an attempt is made to obliterate the past-present distinction20. It is 
literally a walk down memory lane.  
The route starts on the steep slopes of the Creggan shops near Bishop’s Field and 
is mostly downhill all the way to Free Derry Corner where wreaths (and more recently 
crosses) carried on the march are laid at the Bloody Sunday memorial followed by a 
political rally a hundred yards away at the site of the “You Are Now Entering Free 
Derry” mural in Free Derry Corner, the symbolic heart of the predominately Catholic or 
nationalist Bogside. The route is about two miles long and it takes about two hours to 
complete. Unlike in the Orange tradition, there is no return march. In this movement 
through geographical space a movement through historical time takes place as well21. 
Roads in the Bogside are temporarily closed during the march thus suspending the 
normal flow through time and space as if the march takes place in a moment out of time. 
The march stops at several points along the route such as at the Bloody Sunday victims’ 
mural and at the scene of the action, so to speak, at Rossville Street where one minute’s 
silence is observed.  
Banners hung on wooden poles are held by some of the marchers bearing words 
slogans that reflect political grievances and demands of the day. Local flute and drum 
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bands also participate. The band members march in military-style formation and play 
nationalistic music, heightening the aural experience of the march.  At the end of the 
march a political rally takes place. The back of a lorry serves as the platform upon which 
a podium and microphone are erected and a ladder is leaned against the side of the lorry 
to allow the speakers mount the platform. A man holding a tricolor stands on the 
platform. The convenor, normally a local republican, welcomes the crowd. Before the 
speeches get underway, the Irish national anthem is played by a flutist, imbuing the 
occasion with a national as well as a political significance. The names of the wounded are 
then read out followed by the names of the Bloody Sunday dead. A one-minute’s silence 
is then observed. Not everyone who attends the march stays to listen to the political 
speeches at the rally – by the time the two-hour march reaches Free Derry Corner some 
people are tired and leave. 
This act of walking through the streets of Derry, a classic Durkheimian ritual of 
coming together around a common set of symbols that affirm group identity and 
solidarity22, can never be done in exactly the same way twice23. It is a repeated act that is 
at the same time open to imagination and transformation. As Jedlowski puts it “past 
practices are never the same, but are selectively incorporated and reformulated constantly 
according to changing circumstances in our lives: in this sense the practices prolong the 
past within the present, but at the same time reformulate its legacy’24. Embodied 
remembrance then is simultaneously traditional and adaptive25 but Paul Connerton’s 
analysis would lead one to expect little or no adaptation in the face of socio-political 
change. An examination of the stages through which the march passed through provides 
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empirical support for the claim that Connerton overstates the traditional element in 





Stage One: Pre-Hegemonic: SF versus NICRA, 1973-1978 
The first few years of commemorating Bloody Sunday were characterized by 
mnemonic battles between various social movement organizations who competed with 
one another over claims to the memory of the Bloody Sunday dead but two of these 
NICRA and SF emerged as the dominant memory choreographers. Each went about 
remembering Bloody Sunday in very different ways, articulating competing discourses of 
peace on the onehand and violence on the other as well as communicating different 
norms about the content of the march. Memory work26 in the early 1970s was intense 
given the closeness to the original event. Over time, SF took over from NICRA as the 
organizer of the march as Northern Irish society moved into a long and protracted period 
of conflict. The early parades were small-scale, local events drawing crowds of between 
2,000 and 5,000. The public notices for the march of NICRA and SF crystallized how 
each organization seized upon the memory of Bloody Sunday in very different ways. SF 
saw the march as an index of support for physical force republicanism27 as this account 
of the 1978 march by Seamus Boyle in Republican News suggests: “I had a feeling of low 
morale which has always accompanied such marches, about the size of turn-out. Would it 
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be a smaller march than last year? Would a low turnout mean something sinister, and 
would the Press read into it the defeat of the IRA?!!!”28.  
NICRA’s discourse spoke to different truths. NICRA’s press officer, Kevin 
McCorry, in a press statement for the 1973 commemoration stated that the 
commemoration was about remembering the dead as well as helping people realize their 
present political situation: “The people of Derry will remember the thirteen as friends, 
neighbors, and workmates. But they will also remember them as comrades in the struggle 
which has still to be completed, the struggle to end repression, introduce democracy and 
uproot sectarianism from Northern Ireland”29. These competing ideological projects 
pointed to the contested as against the collective nature of memory and called into 
question the non-conflictual understanding of the past that the term “collective memory” 
implies30.  
Public sentiment though was not always behind the SF organized marches and the 
letters page of the local press was a platform upon which a diversity of opinion about the 
marches was expressed. In 1978, Republican News reported that “though we 
commemorate the 14, one or two of the families didn’t attend. They do not appreciate 
that the violent oppression of civil rights plus State massacre equals the necessity for civil 
resistance and armed struggle…this year saw some families march for the first time with 
Sinn Féin’31. One year on, An Phoblacht reported that at the 1979 commemoration 
‘reportedly representatives from all the victims’ families, except those who had left the 
area, were present at the head of the march”32.  
Some citizens letters constructed the march as degrading republican propaganda 
exercises, “no doubt, as we again approach the anniversary of that terrible day in our 
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beloved city’s history, Bloody Sunday, the coat-trailers of the Provisionals, which they 
call their political wing, are busy making plans to turn the day of sorrow into a carnival of 
bands, banners and speeches of hate. In view of the slaughter of innocent people in 
Birmingham, Aldershot, London, Woolwich, and Guildford, carried out in the name of 
Ireland, may I suggest that the relatives of Derry’s 14, the Church and people of Derry, 
do all in their power to deny the Provos the excuse to display their mock hypocrisy on the 
streets of Derry on Bloody Sunday”. The letter goes on to suggest a preferred way of 
commemorating the dead: “Let us honour our dead by going to Mass, praying for the 
souls of the dead and for forgiveness for their killers. Do not let us soil the memory of 
those who died for justice’s sake by falling for Provo propaganda, especially since the 
Provos have shown that they are incapable of understanding the meaning of justice 
themselves through their cowardly murders and knee-cappings”33. 
Beyond these competing discourses, NICRA and SF prescribed different rules 
about the organization of their marches. NICRA’s statement before the 1973 
commemoration called on all organizations “which would hope to commemorate this day 
to zealously protect it from anyone or any group which would attempt to sully the names 
of the dead by seeking to make cheap political capital out of their massacre last year”34. 
Echoing this, the Bogside Community Association also called for a dignified and 
peaceful march saying “no opportunity should be afforded on this occasion to any person 
or group, be they members of the Army or of this community, or anyone else, to 
introduce discord into commemorative proceedings”35. In practical terms, this meant 
draining the march of any political content. The NICRA march was a silent march. 
NICRA asked people not to carry banners and exhorted them, in a statement released on 
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January 27, 1973, to be “an example of dignity and respect to the world or else we reject 
the principles of those who died and we discredit their memory”36. A leaflet for 
distribution to marchers reminded them of the norms governing the march: that it would 
be silent, that wreaths would be carried at the front, that no flags or banners would be 
carried, and that no confrontation would be sought. NICRA, above all, impressed upon 
marchers the dignified and non-political nature of its commemoration and left nothing to 
chance on the day37. 
NICRA’s preparations for the commemoration would consist of issuing a press 
statement outlining its provisional program for the commemoration the month before. 
Matters such as stewarding, catering, fundraising as well as the order of the 
commemoration ceremony were all discussed beforehand. Arrangements for other items 
such as a wreath from the executive of NICRA, loud speakers, a statement from the 
relatives supporting the NICRA commemoration, and the platform, were all made in 
advance38.  
The SF organized marches were much more political in content and included 
marching republican bands and the carrying of banners and flags announcing grievances 
of Irish republicans. Little fidelity to the historical symbolism of original 1972 was 
evident in the content of these marches. This high level of militarism associated with the 
republican parades alienated those who saw the memorialization of Bloody Sunday as an 
occasion to reinforce values associated with peace and democracy rather than violent 
action. NICRA, in particular, criticized SF in very strong terms for the way it used the 
occasion to subvert the meaning of the original march. A letter from NICRA to Alfie 
Byrne in New Zealand, is an instructive example of this, “the Bloody Sunday 
 13 
 
Commemoration was held by us on Saturday in Derry. There were several hundred 
people at the event and it was a quiet, dignified ceremony which passed off without 
incident. Which is more than can be said for yesterday’s demo by Provisional Sinn Féin 
to commemorate Bloody Sunday. The speeches which were made from the platform were 
a disgrace and more so since they were uttered on an occasion like a Bloody Sunday 
commemoration. Maire Drumm said that if Frank Stagg died, they (the Provos) would 
send the SAS back to England in coffins – Kevin Agnew, to my shame a one time 
Chairman of NICRA – said that if Stagg dies, bombings like what happened in 
Birmingham where 21 people died would be like a picnic to what was to come in the 
future (…) it was utterly sickening to hear them say this at such a solemn occasion – 
anyone would think that it was on a march organized by the Provos that the 14 innocents 
were murdered”39. 
But NICRA’s capacity to win the hearts and minds of people was quickly 
diminishing as republicans began to lay waste to its ambitions of effecting change 
through democratic avenues. The smallness of the crowds that it attracted to its 
commemorative events was sufficient evidence of that. SF, even though its marches 
never attracted great crowds either, was emerging as the dominant memory 
choreographer and its definition of the meaning of the memory of Bloody Sunday gained 
ascendency over NICRA’s non-violent message and promotion of Bloody Sunday as a 
symbol of the importance of peaceful means of achieving political goals. SF’s emergence 
as hegemonic gatekeeper of the memory of Bloody Sunday owed as much, it could be 
argued, to the lack of interest among other political actors such as the nationalist SDLP 
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(Social Democratic and Labour Paty) who were better placed to challenged its hegemony 
than a comparatively weak organization like NICRA. 
 
 Stage 2: Hegemonic: SF Takes Over, 1975-1990.  
 The NICRA commemorative march was discontinued in 1975. From this point 
on, SF took over the organization of the march. SF marches did not reach the attendance 
levels of the 1990s partly it must be said, because so many other sectarian killings were 
taking place in Northern Ireland. By 1985 SF had colonized the Bloody Sunday 
commemoration, as it did with other commemorations such as Easter and St. Patrick’s 
Day. Street politics had always been a strong strategy of the republican movement. As 
Jarman puts it “the republican movement became the principal focus for all nationalist 
protest”40. NICRA was no longer a rival, even a weak one. Not surprisingly then, 
criticism of SF from other rival political parties, most notably the SDLP, became more 
frequent.  
Symbolic struggles between constitutional and physical force nationalism carried 
over from stage 1 into this second stage. In 1983, Gerry Adams, leader of SF, attacked 
the constitutional nationalist SDLP for its poor leadership (the SDLP was holding its 
annual conference on the same day as the commemoration) claiming that “what is 
happening here on the streets of Derry is more important in political terms than any 
SDLP conference”41 and went on to say that the SDLP was a declining political party. 
Not surprisingly, the SDLP was known in these years as the “Stoop Down Low Party”42. 
For the first time, John Hume, then leader of the SDLP, publicly rebuked Gerry Adams, 
in a letter to the Derry Journal, for using the commemoration for what he called “party 
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political purposes”. John Hume wrote that, “their deaths have been burned into the 
consciences of the people of Derry. They did not march in support of any party political 
organization. They marched behind the non-violent banner of the Civil Rights Movement 
to oppose the injustices perpetrated against the people”. The letter continues: 
“It is not only distasteful but offensive that anyone should attempt to use their memory 
for party political purposes”43.  
In the letters to the editor section of the local press one gets a sense of public 
sentiment towards the march during this stage. One letter by James Wray, father of Jim 
Wray who was killed on Bloody Sunday, argued that SF organized the annual 
commemoration over the past 11 years while other actors such as the Catholic Church 
and the Irish government stood aside. He asked this rhetorical question:  “Is it possible 
that what really upset Mr Hume was Gerry Adam’s comment that politicians and 
representatives of Church and State ended their commemoration of the Bloody Sunday 
martyrs the day of their burial?” Mr Wray went on to say that, “I can speak not only for 
my family and myself when I thank all the people, Sinn Féin, and, in particular, Gerry 
Adams for participating in the 11th commemoration parade for the Bloody Sunday 
victims”44.  
Another letter by the prolific writer, Sean Carr, argued that John Hume’s letter 
was “a touch of severe sour grapes”. He stated that the reason why John Hume had only 
spoken now was because of SF’s recent electoral performance45. Hugh Gallagher, a 
resident of the predominately nationalist Creggan estate, argued that John Hume’s “own 
conscience should have been troubling him as he sat with his middle-class friends in their 
Forum Hotel in Belfast, while the people of his own city remembered their relatives and 
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friends so cruelly butchered by the British”46. The absence of letters in favor of John 
Hume’s position suggests that SF did enjoy considerable support in the 1980s for the way 
it remembered the Bloody Sunday dead although, as we will see, many people, like John 
Hume, did not participate in the march precisely because it was a SF organized event. 
But it was perhaps the 1990 commemoration that mostly clearly registered the 
discursive struggle between physical force nationalists on the onehand and constitutional 
nationalists on the other. That year’s commemoration was explicitly linked to the 
Birmingham Six47 case. An estimated 5,000 people attended, one of the biggest turnouts 
for a Bloody Sunday march48. During the march, the IRA detonated a bomb. Charles 
Love, a sixteen year old from Strabane, Co. Tyrone, who was attending the march, died 
as a result. The IRA’s bomb was intended for the security forces49. One letter to the 
editor expressed revulsion at the actions of the IRA:  
 
“It was to have been a dignified, commemoration march with a message of justice 
for people who had been wrongly imprisoned, but for myself and others it turned 
into a nightmare. I haven’t been able to sleep thinking of the way he died, even 
though I’ve seen death in many ways before. The march organizers must feel as 
sick as I do. I don’t know if I’ll be able to face the commemoration march next 
year. I certainly will be afraid to let my children go again”50. 
 
Pat Devine, a SDLP councilor, also criticized the organizers of the 
commemoration, the Bloody Sunday Committee, stating that, “the best help that Sinn 
Féin and the Provisional IRA can offer them (the Birmingham Six) is to stay well away 
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from the genuine campaign being waged by people of integrity who are trying to secure 
their freedom. There can be no place in this genuine campaign for individuals or 
organizations who cannot outrightly condemn the outrage on Sunday that was an abuse of 
an anniversary and the wanton taking of a young life”51.  
Bishop Edward Daly, another vocal critic of republicans, issued a public 
statement claiming that “the dominant theme of many of these annual marches has been 
militant and pro-violence rather than anti-violence”. He also stated that “they were 
exploited as a platform by some people who were apologists for campaigns of violence 
and murder – the complete contradiction of what Bloody Sunday meant and means to 
me”52. The Bloody Sunday Commemorative Committee asked the bishop to clarify his 
remarks and in response Bishop Daly called on it to publicly announce its opposition to 
violence and intimidation of all kinds53.  
While the Bloody Sunday Committee, through its spokesperson, Tony Doherty, 
did criticize the IRA’s actions as a “gross error of judgment” it strongly defended itself 
against criticisms by British government ministers, the SDLP, and members of the 
Catholic hierarchy. In its statement it said, “British Ministers have absolutely no right to 
condemn or lecture Irish people about violence or the deaths of civilians. John Cope and 
Brian Mawhinney are members of a government which routinely destroys the lives of 
Irish people and who repeatedly justify the heartbreak which they cause”54. 
This statement from the Bloody Sunday Committee is strikingly similar to the 
discourse of SF at early commemorative marches most notably in its strong criticism of 
“the establishment”, that is, the SDLP and the British government, standard targets of SF 
rhetorical attack. Thus, it is difficult to argue, based on the evidence, that the BSC was 
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completely outside partisan politics because its public statements found an echo in the 
rhetoric of SF.  
 
Stage 3: Quest for Power to Define the Truth, 1990- 
During this stage, beginning in 1990 and reaching its apogee in 1997, the quest 
for power to define the truth about Bloody Sunday took center stage. Although the claims 
and counterclaims of the second stage did not disappear, a slow process of remarketing 
Bloody Sunday and moving away from a politics of blame took place. Broader political 
changes shaped memory work and a critical factor that helped neutralize earlier criticism 
of republicanism from constitutional nationalists, was the IRA’s historic cessation of 
violence in August 1994. This brought about a transformation in the political and security 
environment of Northern Ireland and opened up an opportunity for Irish nationalists and 
republicans alike to bring pressure to bear on the British government to establish a new 
inquiry into Bloody Sunday. Prior to the IRA ceasefire in 1994, rhetorical attacks by the 
SDLP on the organizers of the commemoration differed little from before. In 1992, for 
instance, the invitation by the BSI to Gerry Adams to speak at the rally gave rise to strong 
criticism from William O’Connell of the SDLP. Cllr. O’Connell claimed the BSI was a 
“front for Sinn Féin”55. Responding to Cllr. O’Connell’s comments, the BSI described 
them as “a slur, an insult, and a pathetic attempt at party politics”56. 
Not everyone accepted the SDLP position. Sean Carr’s letter to the Derry 
Journal argued that the “SDLP inspired tirade is merely a smokescreen designed 
to hid the fact that the SDLP has never, as a political party, shown any inclination 
towards leading the people of Derry in a public expression of either grief or 
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defiance towards the Bloody Sunday murders…Bloody Sunday is an acute 
embarrassment to the SDLP hierarchy”57. A marcher from Massachusetts, USA, 
congratulated the BSI for a job well done, “as someone who was interned at the 
time of the Bloody Sunday murders, I would like to congratulate “The Bloody 
Sunday Initiative” on the magnificent way they organized this year’s 
commemoration and other associated events. It was a fitting tribute to the dead”58.  
But these important symbolic changes not enough to convince all that SF’s 
influence had been drained from the march. That the deep structure of the march 
remained untouched and only its surface appearance had changed is suggested by 
this citizen’s letter to the Derry Journal:  
 
“Mr P O’Connor must have been at a different Bloody Sunday March to 
the ‘one’ that I saw. Black taxis leading, banners commemorating IRA 
men, bands in paramilitary uniforms, bus loads of S.F. ‘branches’ and 
supporters from parts of Ireland and Scotland with S.F. banners, and of 
course, Mr. McGuinness, Adams and Co. I don’t have a problem with the 
Republican Movement organizing the Bloody Sunday March to 
commemorate the 14 innocent people murdered by the British army (15 
including Mr Love killed by IRA).The problem is why does Mr. P. 
O’Connor and Mr. C. Feely (Irish Times) keep denying it? Take away the 
banners, the bands, the black taxis. Have a dignified march gentlemen and 




Attacks by SF on the SDLP were standard fare at rallies in the 1980s. 
However, as a result of the peace process, and the movement of SF into 
mainstream constitutional politics, the politics of blame was abandoned in favor 
of attempts to create a pan-nationalist front. At the 2001 commemorative rally 
members of political parties other than SF spoke, an unthinkable scenario prior to 
the IRA’s cessation of violence.  
A transformed political environment found expression in changed political 
discourse. From 1994 on, the ideological project of Irish republicans shifted as rhetoric 
about British injustices, British withdrawal, the ill-treatment of Irish republican prisoners, 
and the need to continue the armed struggle was eclipsed by a stronger emphasis on 
political persuasian, dialogue and negotiation, a new language for a new political 
reality60. The President of SF, Gerry Adams, speaking at the 1995 commemoration, 
stated, well aware of his audience, that “a just and lasting peace is the only memorial 
which can ease the pain and justify the suffering of the victims of Bloody Sunday and all 
those who have suffered”61, political rhetoric that would have been unthinkable at a SF 
rally in the 1970s and 1980s. The SDLP spokesman on policing, Mr Alex Attwood, used 
the occasion to call for progress on police reform and decommissioning in keeping with 
the Belfast Agreement. The SDLP leader, Mark Durkan, spoke at the 2003 
commemoration62. 
This period was marked by three symbolic high water marks in the history of the 
march – the 20th anniversary (1992), the 25th anniversary (1997), and the 30th anniversary 
(2002), important anniversaries in garnering media attention and public participation in 
the march. But it was the 1997 and 2002 anniversary commemorations, as we shall see, 
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that were arguably the most significant. An estimated 40,000 people attended the 30th 
anniversary commemoration63, the best attended parade in recent Northern Irish 
history64.  
Important changes in historical symbolism were evident in this stage. In the early 
1990s, white crosses bearing the names of the dead replaced the traditional floral wreaths. 
In 199265 and 2000, the march did not go to Free Derry Corner and proceeded instead to 
the Guildhall Square, the intended destination of the original march66. Fourteen white 
crosses were laid at the footsteps of the Guildhall and the rally was held in front of it in 
the Guildhall Square67. This change in the route of the march in 2000 was made because 
Free Derry Corner was being landscaped at the time while in 1992 it was done to mark 
the 20th anniversary. But once this symbolic break with the past was first made in 1992, it 
paved the way for other marches to the Guildhall, as happened in 2000. As one key figure 
put it, marching to the Guidhall was a way of “taking the issue right into the open, right 
into the wider world and symbolize that by going into the city center…because I don’t 
think the implications of Bloody Sunday were confined to the Bogside and Creggan”68. 
This spatial strategy then was intended to heighten the symbolic meaning of the march.  
In 1997 and 1998, large-size banner portraits of the victims were erected 
along Southway69 as the marchers made their way down to Free Derry Corner70. 
One respondent in this study remarked how emotionally charged these banners 
were because they brought the dead back to life and symbolically placed them at 




“I suppose the one that really remember … those banners were up there on 
Southway almost as if they were looking over you. The dead were kind of 
there looking over you. Turning that corner and coming down that hill and 
looking up and seeing them…. it was a bit like...That same year, once the 
march came on down to Free Derry Corner you had them down below the 
walls – they took them to London a few years ago while the inquiry was 
sitting in London”71. 
 
Another example of changing historical symbolism was the use of 
spectacle street theatre during the march. For example, in 1997, large-sized 
versions of the front page of the Widgery Tribunal report were carried during the 
march. As they were carried, relatives of the Bloody Sunday dead bearing white 
wooden crosses literally walked through the report to the applause of onlookers72. 
This street theatre is a playful, carnivalesque and symbolic inversion of the 
canonical official memory, a sort of mock parody of Widgery73. In Stoller’s 
terms, this mimicry is a form of “embodied opposition”74. Visual street dramas 
such as this provide an outlet for subaltern groups to resist and disrupt the 
dominant narrative75.  
Greater efforts to make the march more inclusive of other victims and more 
broadly of the other tradition, that is, Unionism, defined this stage. Speeches at the rally 
from 1998 on were dominated by the progress of the Saville Inquiry76. Other examples of 
state violence as a result of collusion between the security forces and loyalist 
paramilitaries received attention as well such as the New Lodge Six killings, the 
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Ballymurphy Six and the case of Pat Finucane77. The “Open Up The Files” campaign 
was launched at the 2003 commemoration, a campaign aimed at bringing pressure to bear 
on the British government to release files relating to state collusion in loyalist 
paramilitary killings78. A Protestant dimension to the commemoration was added through 
seminars addressing the meaning of Bloody Sunday to this tradition79 and extending 
invitations to members of the Protestant community to attend commemorative events.  
Intensive memory entrepreneurship to preserve the memory of Bloody Sunday 
and appeal to a new younger generation lacking in first-hand knowledge of the event was 
a key feature of stage 3. A number of organizations emerged at this time but because of a 
good deal of overlap in personnel, goals and material resources between these different 
organizations that emerged, it is difficult to discern when one organization left off and 
another began.  For the most part, they seemed to work to the same agenda of keeping 
Bloody Sunday and other human rights issues on the political and media radar. These 
organizations included the Bloody Sunday Initiative (1990), the Bloody Sunday Justice 
Campaign80 (1992), the Bloody Sunday Weekend Committee81 (1992), the Pat Finucane 
Centre82 (1993), and the Bloody Sunday Trust83 (1997).  
These organizational name changes reflected the crucial linkage between the 
memorialization of Bloody Sunday and the campaign to overturn the official written 
down history of the event. In the third stage, and unlike the previous stages, this project 
of attempting to dislodge the official memory with a vernacular memory, or put another 
way, to translate the vernacular memory into official memory, came to the fore. Overall, 
Bloody Sunday was commemorated in a more celebratory and inclusive way as the 
memory choreographers employed traditional forms of memorialization such as 
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museums, film, exhibitions, and seminars to remember the event and appeal to new 
publics beyond the nationalist and republican support base. As one key-informant put it,  
 
“Well there has been some talk and I don’t know …. because now the 
commemoration is quite an event for the city. I think the march should end on a 
high march. The last march…is a huge big march. It passes off peacefully and is 
well attended. And all of that. It (the commemoration) may be taking on a persona 
of its own. I mean it is big tourist business for the city. A lot of people who come 
to the city they want to go to the Bogside and they want to see the murals. And 
Bloody Sunday is a big part of that. There is a huge interest after the films”84.  
 
A new emphasis on linking Bloody Sunday to other examples of injustice and 
oppression in other times and places was also apparent in the rhetoric of memory 
entrepreneurs85. The inclusion of cultural organizations such as the Ancient Order of 
Hibernians in the annual march and the choice of themes for the commemoration, such as 
“One World, Many Struggles” in 2002, was another example of this. Ireland’s 
participation in the global economy and society and a deliberate effort to make Bloody 
Sunday meaningful to people with no direct connection to the events of January 30, 1972, 
may well help to explain this linking of the Bloody Sunday story to other global events.  
Above all, these examples help to show how an act of embodied memorialization, that 
seems, on the face of it to be a fixed, unchanging event from one year to another, consists 
of a range of symbolic changes linked to broader transformations in the socio-political 
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context, and in particular, to shifts in the relationships between Northern Irish 
Catholics/nationalists and Protestants/unionists.   
 
Conclusion 
 Paul Connerton’s influential work alerts us to the importance of embodied 
remembrance in our studies of collective memory and warns against the 
overemphasis on inscribed memory in existing sociological and anthropological 
research. Clearly, he has done collective memory scholars a great service by 
doing this. However, as I have tried to argue in this paper, he carries his argument 
about the fixity of embodied remembrance too far. Memory work in the context of 
a deeply divided society such as Northern Ireland is highly contested and 
Connerton’s claim about the resistant qualities of bodily memory is in need of 
modification to take account of societies in which the past is intensely fought over 
and constantly mobilized in contemporary constructions and re-constructions of 
group identity. I have tried to show that bodily memory organized against official 
modes of commemoration responds to and reflects changes in the socio-political 
context.  Changes in the symbols and banners carried on the march, changes in the 
route of the march, and changes in the types of social movement organizations 
participating in the march and in civic leaders speaking at the rally, all pointed to 
the malleability of non-official embodied remembrance.  
Of course the remembrance of Bloody Sunday involves far more than the 
annual re-enactment of the original 1972 march examined here, encompassing a 
wide range of inscriptions including books, websites, films, murals, poetry, song, 
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and museum exhibits, memorialization, represented by the Rossville Street 
memorial to Bloody Sunday in the Bogside area of Derry city86, as well as 
spectacle such as street theatre and finally, performance of the past which I 
focused on. It could be argued that the performative dimension shapes and is 
shaped by the memorialization and inscriptions87. As mentioned earlier, the 
annual march stops at the Rossville Street memorial and the Bloody Sunday mural 
where a minute’s silence is observed, suggesting that people’s experience of the 
march is scripted by these two sites of inscribed memory.  
This performative dimension, as this paper has attempted to show, 
operated as a crucial focal point around which competing political discourses got 
articulated88. In the 1970s, as we saw, Sinn Féin seized upon the memory of 
Bloody Sunday to articulate a violent republican message while NICRA saw it as 
a metaphor for the futility of violent means to bring about political change. This 
republican interpretation was carried into the 1980s but as the peace process 
gained momentum in Northern Ireland in the 1990s it was eschewed in favour of a 
narrative emphasizing the capacity of the march to function as an important 
platform for dislodging the official memory with a vernacular nationalist memory, 
important symbolic shifts linked to changes in the relationships between the 
British and Irish states and Northern Ireland’s two divided communities.    
 Moreover, this analysis showed, following Halbwachs, that the way the 
past is remembered has a lot to do with contemporary needs and issues. 
Presentism operates as a powerful mediator of the past. Political discourses at the 
commemoration rally, as we saw earlier, reflected republican grievances of the 
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day. In the 1970s, for example, grievances about the political status of republican 
prisoners loomed large as a concern of Irish republicans. In more recent times, 
concerns about such things as collusion between paramilitaries and state security 
forces have been articulated. There is greater emphasis than ever before in Bloody 
Sunday commemorations of inserting it into a global frame of reference, thus 
helping to give the Bloody Sunday story resonance with new publics.89 With the 
passage of time, the tone of commemorations has become much more celebratory 
with concerts, discos, film screenings, table quizzes, and the like now a staple part 
of the annual commemoration programme. Alongside this we see the emergence 
of Bloody Sunday CD-ROMs, posters, mug coasters, and t-shirts, highlighting the 
infiltration of memory work with important objects of consumer culture and 
extending the memory of Bloody Sunday in time and space.   
 
Acknowledgement 
I thank the reviewers and editor for very helpful comments and suggestions for 
improving this paper. Thanks also to the key-informants in Derry for telling me 
about their experiences of Bloody Sunday commemorations. A Zahm Travel 
Grant from the Graduate School, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, USA, part-
funded archival research and interview data collection (May-October 2004) in 
Derry, Northern Ireland. This article is based on a chapter in the author’s doctoral 

















                                                 
1For representative examples see Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, Frames of Remembrance: The 
Dynamics of Collective Memory (New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1994); John 
Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration and Patriotism in the 
Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Barbara Misztal, 
Theories of Social Remembering (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2003); Lyn 
Spillman, Nation and Commemoration: Creating National Identities in the United States 
and Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Yoshikuni Igarashi, 
Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Jennifer Cole, Forget Colonialism? 
Sacrifice and the Art of Memory in Madagascar (Berkeley: University of California, 
2001); Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European 
cultural history (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); James V. Wertsch, 
Voices of Collective Remembering (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). For 
a review of the collective memory literature from a specifically sociological perspective 
see Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins, “Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective 
Memory’ to Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices” Annual Review of Sociology 
24 (1998: 105-140). 
2 For more on this see Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember. Work by Stoller also 
uses Connerton’s analysis as a conceptual jumping-off point. Paul Stoller, “Embodying 
Colonial Memories.” American Anthropologist 96 (1994: 634–48). Also see Sandra Lee, 
“Dys-appearing Tongues and Bodily Memories: The Aging of First-Generation Resident 
Koreans in Japan.” Ethos 28 (2000:198-223). 
3 Bloody Sunday refers to the shooting dead of 13 civilians while peacefully marching 
against internment in Derry, Northern Ireland, 30 Janaury, 1972. This event was a 
watershed in the collective memory of ‘The Troubles’, the 30-year campaign of violence 
and murder carried out by loyalist and republican paramilitary organizations and the 
 29 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
British state over contested claims to the territory of Northern Ireland. In particular, it 
became a key part of the collective narrative of the victimized nationalist community and 
a key reference point shaping republican ideology and behavior. 
4 The distinction between settled/unsettled cultures used here comes from the work of 
Ann Swidler. Talk of Love: How Culture Matters (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2001). 
5 How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 4. 
6 How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 4. 
7 An effort to complexify and problematize Connerton’s work is set forth in Lyn Spillman 
and Brian Conway, “Texts, Bodies and the Memory of Bloody Sunday” Symbolic 
Interaction 30:1 (2007: 79-103). 
8 How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 72. 
9 How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 45. 
10 How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 45. 
11 Bloody Sunday, for the most part, has come to be viewed as a “nationalist” or 
“republican” event. But it also means something to the Protestant/unionist community, 
through clearly there are important shades of opinion within it, just as there are within the 
nationalist community. It would be misleading, then, to reduce the Protestant community 
to a single point of view of this event. But it is fairly true to say that Protestants view the 
event from their own perspective and that this has shifted over time. We can distinguish 
between Protestant reaction to the original event, to the commemoration of Bloody 
Sunday, and to the more recent Saville Inquiry.  
Most Protestant opinion echoed that of the British state and viewed the march as 
an illegal activity that should not have taken place in the first place and that had the 
march not taken place nobody would have died. This point tended to be highlighted in 
Protestant media coverage of the Bloody Sunday commemorations. An article about the 
annual commemoration in the Londonderry Sentinel, the city’s main Protestant 
newspaper, stated that a rally was held to “mark the fourth anniversary of the deaths of 13 
people, who were shot during a banned Civil Rights march” (Londonderry Sentinel, 
February 4, 1976, p. 21). Some Protestant people in Derry were shocked and repulsed by 
the events of January, 30. Others were indifferent to it. Still others felt that Bloody 
Sunday should have been called ‘Good Sunday’ and that it was unfortunate that more 
people were not killed (Derry Journal, January 18, 1973, n.p.). During the 1970s and 
1980s, the Bloody Sunday commemorations were often reported upon in the local 
Protestant newspapers such as the Londonderry Sentinel but the coverage tended to focus 
on skirmishes, riots or other violent incidents take took place on the march or at the 
fringes of it. The banned nature of the original 1972 march also tended to be 
foregrounded.    
By the 1990s, unionist opinion had changed. In 1992, Gregory Campbell of the 
Democratic Unionist Party wrote an article in a special feature about Bloody Sunday in 
the Irish News (Belfast daily newspaper with a mainly Catholic/nationalist readership), 
itself an important indicator of change, in which he stated that after Bloody Sunday, “I 
felt nothing and that was typical of the Protestant community” (Irish News, January 30, 
1992, p. 9). At a seminar on ‘Unionist/Loyalist Perspectives on the Peace Process’ in 
Pilots Row Community Centre as part of the 23rd anniversary commemoration (Derry 
 30 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Journal, January 20, 1995, p. 5), Gregory Campbell stated that “over the years within the 
Unionist community has developed a greater appreciation of the depth and intensity that 
the nationalist community have felt regarding the suffering that they went through but at 
that time there was not” (Derry Journal, February 3, 1995, p. 5). In 1997, a seminar in 
the Calgach Centre, Butcher Street, Derry, attended by representatives from the 
Democratic Unionist Party and the Ulster Unionist Party addressed the issue of Protestant 
perceptions of Bloody Sunday (Derry Journal, July 11, 1997, p. 3), indicating that the 
Protestant community was now clearly a key part of the constituency that memory 
entrepreneurs during this period sought to appeal to.  
 
12 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1950). Also see Barry Schwartz, “Social Change and Collective Memory: The 
Democratization of George Washington” American Sociological Review 56 (1991: 221-
236).  
13 Sinn Féin refers to the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, a paramilitary 
organization which has sought to bring about, through violent means, an end to British 
occupation of Northern Ireland. Since the 1990s, SF has moved closer and closer to the 
political mainstream as the IRA in turn has abandoned its long-standing ‘armed struggle’ 
against British rule. SF is now the dominant political party representing Irish nationalists 
and republicans in Northern Ireland, outvoting its long-time rival, the Social Democratic 
and Labour Party (SDLP). In recent times, SF has also made significant political gains in 
the Republic of Ireland, owing, at least in part, to the party’s significant organizational 
abilities particularly in working-class areas often neglected by other political parties.   
14 NICRA refers to a civil rights organization that emerged in Northern Ireland in the late 
1960s. Based on principles of non-violence and peaceful protest and taking the lead from 
the American civil rights movement, it sought to end discrimination in voting, housing 
and employment. It organized a number of high-profile marches that pressed its 
campaign for reform on the national consciousness. Its “repertoire of contention” (see 
Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) included marches and sit-ins. In the 1970s, because of 
the reaction of the British state to its political claim-making around housing and job 
discrimination, law and order issues came to the fore. For a classic account of the 
organization see Bob Purdie, Politics in the Streets: The Origins of the Civil Rights 
Movement in Northern Ireland (Belfast, Blackstaff Press, 1990).  See also Niall Ó 
Dochartaigh, From Civil Rights to Armalities: Derry and the Birth of the Irish Troubles 
(Cork: Cork University Press, 1997).  
15 Lloyd W. Warner, The Living and the Dead: a study of the symbolic life of Americans 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975), 235. 
16 See David Kertzer, Ritual, Politics and Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1988). 
17 For more detail see Neil Jarman, Material Conflict: Parades and Visual Displays in 
Northern Ireland (Oxford: Berg, 1997). See also Dominic Bryan, Orange Parades: the 
politics of ritual, tradition and control (London: Pluto Press, 2000). 
18 For an example of this, see Kelleher, The Troubles in Ballybogoin, (Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 2003). 
 31 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 See Jarman, Material Conflict.  
20 Eviatar Zerubavel, "Calendars and History: A Comparative Study of the Social 
Organization of National Memory," in Jeffrey K. Olick, ed., States of Memory: 
Continuities, Conflicts, and Transformations in National Retrospection. (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2003). 
21 Connerton, How Societies Remember; see also Luke Gibbons, "'Where Wolfe Tone's 
statue was not': Joyce, monuments and memory."  Ian McBride, ed., in History and 
Memory in Modern Ireland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Charles 
Withers, "Place, Memory, Monument: Memorializing the Past in Contemporary Highland 
Scotland," Ecumene, 3 (1996: 325-344). 
22 Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: The Free Press, 
1995). 
23 See Neil Jarman 1997. Material Conflicts: Parades and Visual Displays in Northern 
Ireland (Oxford: Berg, 1997); David Kertzer, Ritual, Politics and Power (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1988); Joseph Roach, Cities of the Dead: circum-Atlantic 
Performance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).  
24Paulo Jedlowski, "Memory and Sociology: Themes and Issues," Time and Society 10 
(2001: 29-44). 
25 Kertzer, Ritual, Politics and Power. 
26 The concept of memory work comes from the work of Jennifer A. Jordan, A Matter of 
Time, 44. 
27 Northern Irish nationalism has tended to be divided between physical force nationalists 
(e.g. SF) on the onehand and constitutional nationalists on the other (e.g. SDLP). Physical 
force nationalists favour violent means to bring about political change. The distinction 
between provisional (‘the Provos’) and official (‘the Officials’) SF goes back to a split in 
the republican movement in the 1970s between one camp (‘the Officials’), favouring a 
more socialist route to political change, who became known as ‘the Stickies’ because of 
the Easter lily badges they wore on their lapels, and another camp (‘the Provos’), 
favouring a more militant and violent strategy of ending British occupation. The ‘other’ 
tradition in Northern Ireland is referred to as Unionism, a catch-all term for a people who 
claim loyalty to Westminister and to the British Crown and who wish to maintain the 
union with the British mainland. Most Unionists belong to the Protestant faith tradition 
(just as most nationalists are Catholic), at least nominally anyhow.  
28 Republican News, February 4, 1978, 6. 
29 Irish Press, January 18, 1973, LHNIPC, NIO Cuttings File, Civil Rights Association, 
File 4. 
30 Jennifer Jordan, “A Matter of Time: Examining Collective Memory in Historical 
Perspective in Postwar Britain,” Journal of Historical Sociology, 18: 1/2 (2005: 37-71). 
31 Republican News, February 4, 1978, 6. 
32 An Phoblacht/Republican News, February 3, 1979, 6. 
33 Derry Journal, December 10, 1974, 6. 
34 NICRA press statement, January 1, 1973, LHNIPC, NICRA box 1. 




                                                                                                                                                 
36 Derry Journal, January 28, 1973, n.p. 
37 Suggested Text for Leaflet for Marchers at the 1974 NICRA commemoration, 
LHNIPC, NICRA box 24. 
38 NICRA press statement, January 22, 1974, LHNIPC, NICRA box 24. 
39 Letter, NICRA to Alfie Byrne, New Zealand, February 3, 1976, LHNIPC NICRA box 
9. The SAS refers to the Special Air Service, a wing of the British army specializing in 
counter-terrorism and undercover work.  
40 Jarman, Material Conflict, 150. 
41 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 3 February, 1983, 12. 
42War and an Irish Town, (London: Pluto Press, 1993), 40. 
43 Derry Journal, February 1, 1983, 6. 
44 James Wray, letter to the editor, Derry Journal, February 4, 1983, 11. 
45 Derry Journal, February 15, 1983, 6. 
46 Derry Journal, February 8, 1983, 6. 
47 The Birmingham Six refers to six men who were imprisoned for the bombing of two 
pubs in Birmingham on November 21, 1974. Their convictions were overturned in 1991 
by the British Court of Appeal.  
48 Derry Journal, January 30, 1990, 6. 
49 Derry Journal, January 30, 1990, 1; An Phoblacht/Republican News, February 1, 1990, 
8-9. 
50 Derry Journal, February 6, 1990, 8. 
51 Derry Journal, January 30, 1990, 9. 
52 Londonderry Sentinel, January 31, 1989, 3. 
53 Londonderry Sentinel, January 24, 1990, 15. 
54 Derry Journal, February 2, 1990, 3. 
55 Derry Journal, January 24, 1992, 1. 
56 Derry Journal, January 24, 1992, 1. 
57 Derry Journal, January 31, 1992, 2. 
58 Anonymous, letter to the editor, Derry Journal, March 6, 1992,  4. 
59 Anonymous, letter to the editor, Derry Journal, March 4, 1997,  14. 
60 Derry Journal, January 31, 1995,  2; The Sentinel, February 3, 1999, 10; An 
Phoblacht/Republican News, February 6, 1997,  10; An Phoblacht/Republican News, 
February 3, 1994,  8. The ‘peace process’ refers to the process of negotiation between 
nationalists and unionists and the British and Irish governments about the political 
organization of Northern Irish society.  
61 Derry Journal, January 31, 1995,  2 
62 Irish News, February 6, 2003, 19. 
63 An Phoblacht/Republican News, February 7, 2002, 10.  
64 Jarman reports that some Twelfth (July 12) parades in the 1820s drew crowds of 
50,000-60,000 (Jarman, 1997,  53) and that Orange Order parades in the 1870s attracted 
up to 100,000 (ibid,  65). In Derry, the 1960 Apprentice Boys parade commemorating the 
siege of the city drew a crowd of 40,000 (Jarman, Material Conflict, 75). 
65 In 1991, a republican internment parade went to Belfast City Hall for the first time on 
its way to the Falls Road (Jarman, Material Conflict, 151). 
66 An Phoblacht/Republican News, January 30, 1992, 1. 
 33 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
67 An Phoblacht/Republican News, February 3, 2000, 20. 
68 Interview with author, August 15, 2004. 
69 The Bogside artists, a group of Derry artists, put together a set of six life-size puppets 
of British paratroopers and hung them from the Derry Walls overlooking Free Derry 
Corner during the 1998 commemoration. The puppets were painted yellow to signify the 
cowardly actions of the soldiers (Kelly, Kelly and Hasson, Murals). 
70 An Phoblacht/Republican News, February 6, 1997, 10. 
71 Interview with author, 20 October, 2004. 
72 An Phoblacht/Republican News, February 6, 1997, 11. 
73 For detail see Don Handelman, Models and Mirrors: towards an anthropology of 
public events. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).  See also Connerton, 
How Societies Remember. 
74 See Paul Stoller, “Embodying Colonial Memories.” American Anthropologist 96(3)  
(1994, 634-48). 
75 See Arthur Kleinman and Joan Kleinman, “How Bodies Remember: Social Memory 
and Bodily Experience of Criticism, Resistance, and Delegitimation Following China’s 
Cultural Revolution,” New Literary History 25 (1994, 707-23).  
76 Irish News, January 31, 2000, 3. 
77 Irish News, February 6, 2003, 19; Derry Journal, January 30, 2001, 11; Irish News, 
January 29, 2001, 4; An Phoblacht/Republican News, February 4, 1999, p10-11; An 
Phoblacht/Republican News, February 6, 2003, 10. 
78 An Phoblacht/Republican News, February 6, 2003, 11. 
79 Derry Journal, July 11, 1997, 3. 
80 The aims of the BSJC were three-fold: to campaign for the British government to 
acknowledge the innocence of the dead, to repudiate Widgery’s report and to prosecute 
the soldier’s responsible for the killings. 
81 A sub-committee of the BSI, the Bloody Sunday Weekend Committee, organized the 
annual commemorative events from 1992. 
82 On May 1, 1993, the BSI was re-christened as the Pat Finucane Centre (1993). 
Commenting on the new PFC in 1993, Paul O’Connor stated that ‘the transition from the 
Bloody Sunday Initiative to the Pat Finucane Centre reflects the success in terms of work 
and profile which the Initiative has achieved over the past four years. Increasingly our 
workload has reflected a social justice and human rights agenda in addition to the issue of 
redressing the injustice of Bloody Sunday’ (Derry Journal, April 30, 1993,  2). He went 
on to say that since the establishment of the BSJC in 1993 that ‘it has since become clear 
that real confusion has been created in the minds of many people with two groups 
working closely together with “Bloody Sunday” in their title. It is for this reason that 
members of the BSI decided to change the group’s name to the Pat Finucane Centre’ 
(Derry Journal, April 30, 1993, 2). The Pat Finucane Center, named after the human 
rights lawyer killed in February 1989 by the UDA in collusion with a British MI5 agent, 
was established as a human rights organization. 
83 This organization is composed of members of the families of the Bloody Sunday dead, 
academics and local community activists. 
84 Interview with author, 20 October, 2004. 
 34 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
85 See Brian Conway, “Active Remembering, Selective Forgetting and Collective 
Identity: The Case of Bloody Sunday” Identity: An International Journal of Theory and 
Research 3:4 (2003:305-323). 
86 For a comprehensive account of the history and development of the Bloody Sunday 
memorial, Rossville Street, Derry, see Brian Conway, “Texts, Bodies and 
Commemoration: Bloody Sunday (1972) as a Case Study” Ph.D. dissertation, 
Department of Sociology, University of Notre Dame (2005:185-206).  
87 For an extended discussion of the relationship between embodied and inscribed 
memory, a neglected aspect of Connerton’s study, see Lyn Spillman and Brian Conway, 
“Texts, Bodies and the Memory of Bloody Sunday” Symbolic Interaction 30:1 (2007: 79-
103).   
88 See Jeffrey Alexander and Philip Smith’s work on the concept of binary codes in 
political discourse in The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural Sociology (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003).  
89Gille and Ó Riain argue that “references to global ideas and actors today provide an 
entrance ticket to participating in public discourse, and those unwilling or unable to 
formulate their claims in global terms often find themselves invisible. See Zsuzsa Gille 
and Seán Ó Riain, “Global Ethnography,” Annual Review of Sociology 28 (2002: 271-
295), 283. 
 35 
 
